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Effects of Antidumping Duties with Bertrand Competition:  




 Antidumping  duties  are  popular  in  the  United  States  because  under  the  Byrd 
Amendment domestic industry gets to keep tariff revenues.  However, whether antidumping 
duties are an effective instrument of protection depends crucially on the tariff’s ability to 
increase demand for the home good.   Under Bertrand competition, the Byrd Amendment 
enhances  tariff  effects  on  the  home  price  and  trade  flows  in  comparison  to  perfect 
competition.    Assuming  Bertrand  competition  and  differentiated  products,  price-reaction 
functions of frozen catfish fillets are derived and estimated jointly with a demand equation 
using  monthly  data  for  the  period  January  1999  -  December  2005.  An  inverse  demand 
equation for farm-level products is also added to explore the efficacy of the tariff on price of 
farmed catfish.  The estimated increase associated with the duty is exhibited tiny in price and 
sales of domestic fillets but insignificant in farm price.  The result suggests antidumping 
duties are a weak tool for protecting the domestic catfish industry.   
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Through  various  GATT/WTO  rounds,  tariff  barriers  have  decreased  worldwide,  but 
antidumping  measure  has  surged  to  play  a  crucial  role  as  the  most  important  non-tariff 
barrier  (Zanardi,  2004).    Antidumping  duty  is  recently  used  more  frequently,  by  more 
countries,  and  against  more  products  (Prusa,  2005).    As  processed  and  differentiated 
agricultural  products  are  increasingly  traded  cross  national  borders  (Reimer  and Stiegert, 
2006)  more  of  them  are  facing  antidumping  measures  taken  by  importing  countries 
(Kinnucan and Myrland, 2005, Bown, 2006). 
Since the 1980s, the rise in international competition has led many U.S. firms to seek 
protection from foreign imports (Hansen and Prusa, 1996).  One of the protection tools is the 
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, commonly referred to as the Byrd 
Amendment.   The  Byrd  Amendment  permits  successful  petitioners  for  anti-dumping  and 
countervailing  duties  to  collect  tariff  revenues.    It  also  increases  the  incentive  for  the 
domestic firm to increase its price because by doing so it increases the sales of the foreign 
firm, which increases the domestic firm’s revenue from the tariff.   
As a consequence, the Byrd Amendment has the paradoxical effect of increasing the 
value and total volume of imports (Evenett, 2006) compared to the equilibrium without the 
Byrd Amendment and undermines the original intent of the duty.  Related research suggests 
antidumping duties in a competition tend to be ineffective in that an importing country’s 
demand for a product from a particular supply source tends to be highly elastic in relation to 
supply from that source, which means most of the duty is borne by the foreign supplier rather 
than the importing-country consumer (Kinnucan, 2003). 
The purpose of this research is to test the hypotheses advanced by Kinnucan (2003) 
and Evenett (2006) by measuring the effects of recent anti-dumping duties imposed by the       4 
United States on frozen catfish fillet imports from Vietnam.  Assuming Bertrand competition 
and differentiated products, price-reaction functions are derived and estimated jointly with a 
demand equation using monthly data for the period January 1999 - December 2005.  A farm-
level inverse demand is then added to quantify the effects of the duties on farm price, the 
industry’s main motivation for filing the petition in the first place. 
Catfish production is one of the biggest aquaculture industries in the United State and 
frozen catfish fillets are an important product of the US catfish processing industry (Harvey, 
2005).  The catfish “trade war” represents a useful case study in that the anti-dumping duties 
are  large  (ranging  from  45%  to  64%  of  the  import  price),  affected  virtually  all  of  the 
companies in Vietnam that export to the United States, and were implemented in 2003, two 
years after the Byrd Amendment went into force.  
Literature Review 
Imperfect Competition in Agricultural International Trade 
While there are a few studies examining imperfect competition of international markets for 
non-agricultural products and services (Reimer and Stiegert, 2006), a large number of the 
competitive behaviors in specific agricultural products have been documented.   
Rice  is  the  most  popularly  traded  agricultural  products.    With  a  dynamic  New 
Empirical Industrial Organization approach to examine structure of international rice export 
market,  Karp  and  Perloff  (1989)  confirm  that  the  market  is  oligopolistic  with  Thailand, 
Pakistan  and  China  are  modeled  as  oligopolists  and  all  other  countries  as  a  competitive 
fringe.  Competitive behaviors between US and Thailand exporter in the market are also 
imperfect (Yumkella, Unnevehr and Garcia, 1994).       5 
Glauben and Loy (2003) find that there are exercises of market power by German 
export of beer to North America, in exports of sugar confectionery to the UK and in exports 
of cocoa powder to Italy.  The market powers might be explained by fixed contracts, which 
are often used in the food and beverage export market.  Using a census of some 500 firms for 
the period 1990–2002, Wilhelmsson (2006) also suggests that firms in the Swedish food and 
beverage  industry  do  enjoy  some  varied  degrees  of  market  power  and  increased  foreign 
competition has contributed to reducing market power in sectors that were protected by tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to trade prior to Swedish EU membership.  
The imperfect competitive behaviors are also found in international markets of other 
commodities.  Brazil and Columbia are oligopolistics in coffee export market (Karp and 
Perloff, 1993).  Philippines takes substantial market power in the coconut oil exports market 
(Buschena and Perloff, 1991) whereas German banana import market follows Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium (Deodhar and Sheldon, 1996).  In international wheat market, there are exist 
evidence for price discrimination and market power by US wheat exporters (Pick and Park, 
1991,  Patterson  and  Abbott,  1994).    Empirical  study  of  Carter  and  MacLaren  (1997) 
indicates that sale data of US and Australian beef exporters fits the Stackerberg model with 
price leadership by Australians.  Statistical evidence also confirms that the global malting 
barley market operates as a Cournot quantity setting oligopoly (Dong et al., 2006). 
Antidumping Measurement – Definition and Investigation Process 
Under the GATT/WTO regulations, foreign suppliers named in antidumping suits must met 
two criteria for duties to be imposed (Knetter and Prusa, 2000).  First, there must be evidence 
that the domestic industry has materially injured (e.g., a loss or decline in profitability) by 
foreign imports.  Second, the foreign suppliers must be found to be selling their products at       6 
“less than fair value” prices.  A dumping case occurs when subject products are sold at a 
price “less than fair value”.  According to Knetter and Prusa (2000), “less than fair value” is 
determined: (1) by showing that the price charged in the domestic market by the foreign 
suppliers is below the price charged for the same product in other markets (i.e., the “price-
based” method) or (2) by showing that the price charged in the domestic market is below an 
estimate of cost plus a normal return (i.e., the “constructed-value” method). 
In the United States, the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the International Trade 
Commission  (ITC)  administrate  the  antidumping  laws.  Each  has  distinct  roles  in  the 
antidumping investigation process.  For response to petition filed by domestic firms, the 
DOC calculates whether foreign firms are selling the product to the US at less than “normal” 
or “fair” value, i.e. whether dumping has occurred.  The department then calculates an ad 
valorem  dumping  margin  equal  to  the  percentage  difference  between  the  US  transaction 
prices  they  observe  and  fair  value.    The  ITC,  in  its  turn,  has  to  determine  whether  the 
domestic industry has been materially injured, or is threatened with material injury caused by 
accused imported products.  Both agencies make preliminary and final determinations during 
the investigation.  According to Blonigen and Heynes (2002) if they both give affirmative 
preliminary determination, the importer must post a cash deposit, a bond or other security 
equal to the preliminary margin determined by DOC for each entry of the subject product.  
This  requirement  stays  in  effect  until  either  the  DOC  and  ITC  makes  a  negative  final 
determination.  If both agencies give an affirmative final determination, an order is issued by 
DOC to levy an antidumping duty equal to the estimated dumping margin on the subject 
product.  In a timeline, Blonigen and Heynes (2002) summarize the investigation process and       7 
suggest  that  it  would  be  taking  up  to  280  days  from  the  petition  filed  to  the  ITC  final 
determination. 
The Byrd Amendment and Its Impacts 
The  "Byrd  Amendment",  named  after  its  sponsor  Democratic  Senator  Robert  Byrd  and 
passed by US Congress in 2000, permits plaintiffs to collect revenues from the antidumping 
and/or  countervailing  duty.    The  disbursement  is  available  only  to  "affected  domestic 
producers for qualifying expenditures."  An "affected domestic producer" is defined as a 
manufacturer, producer, farmer, rancher, or worker representative (including associations of 
such persons) that (1) was a petitioner or interested party in support of a petition with respect 
to  which  an  antidumping  or  countervailing  duty  order  was  in  effect  and  (2)  remains  in 
operation.  Producers that have ceased production of the product covered by the order or that 
have been acquired by a firm that opposed the petition would not be considered an affected 
domestic producer (ITC, 2006)  
The Byrd Amendment has been found in violation of WTO trade remedy rules (Jung 
and Lee, 2003) and imposes distortions on the U.S. economy.  The Congressional Budget 
Office (2004) estimates that $3.85 billion in revenues collected will be distributed to firms 
between 2005 and 2014.  Between 2001 and 2004, $1 billion was paid to 770 firms that were 
allegedly harmed by unfair trade practices (GAO, 2005) but more than one-third going to a 
single corporation, the Timken Company, and two of its subsidiaries (CITAC, 2006).  More 
than half of the $226 million of Byrd Amendment payouts in 2005 went to five companies, 
and 80% percent of the payouts went to only 34 companies (CITAC 2006) and two thirds of 
the disbursement flow to only 3 of the 77 eligible industries (GAO, 2005).  Three industries 
benefited the most from the Byrd payments are ball bearings, candles, and steel (CITAC       8 
2006).    The  amounts  distributed  to  individual  corporations  can  distort  the  competitive 
structure of an industry, leading to a reduction in competition. 
The Byrd Amendment not only harms the U.S. economy but also hurts US exporters.  
Under complaints filed by 11 trading partners including European, Canada and Mexico, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled in January 2003 that the Byrd Amendment was in 
violation of U.S. trade obligations and complaining countries have been awarded the right to 
impose retaliatory duties on U.S. exports, up to $134 million in 2005 (Odessey 2006).  Thus, 
the  longer  Byrd  payments  still  offered  to  US  domestic  industries,  the  more  US’s  trade 
partners  can  retaliate  against  U.S.  goods,  and  the  more  U.S.  consumers  suffer.    Besides 
various literatures on effects of antidumping measurement, for instance, Blonigen and Prusa 
(2001), Blonigen and Heynes (2002), Kinnucan (2003), Zanardi (2004), Hansen and Prusa 
(1996), Prusa (2005), Feenstra (2004), Kinnucan and Myrland (2005), there also exist studies 
on impacts of the Byrd Amendment.   
Jung and Lee (2003) suggest that the Byrd Amendment provides an incentive for 
domestic industries to file antidumping legislations, distort competition between the firms 
who are beneficiaries and those who did not have enough resource or information to support 
the  petitions.    The  amendment  disappoints  the  legitimate  expectation  from  exporting 
countries and infringe on the rights of the other countries to open and transparent trade.  It 
hurts downstream industries, consumers and global welfare also.  Empirical results of Olson 
(2005) provide strong evidence that more US domestic industries have lobbied for more tariff 
protection,  or  filed  more  antidumping  petitions  since  passage  of  the  Byrd  Amendment.  
Modeling pricing behaviors over bureaucratic discretion and the Byrd Amendment, Evenett 
(2006) shows that where the  Byrd Amendment raises prices in equilibrium, a seemingly       9 
paradoxical result arises as the foreign firm is better off.  The foreigner profit rises because of 
the excess of price over marginal costs increases and the amount of dumping duties paid per 
unit falls as the foreign firm’s price increases.  The Byrd Amendment was at last repealed by 
the US Congress in January 2006 but the repeal will not go into force until October 2007.  
Theoretical Framework 
Tariff Effects under the Byrd Amendment 
The efficacy of antidumping duties depends crucially on tariff absorption.  To see this in a 
differentiated product context with Bertrand competition, let the demand curve for the home 
product be defined as follows:  
(1)    2 1 1 1 1 1 P P Q γ β α + − =  
where Q1 is the quantity sold of the home product, P1 is the price paid by home consumer for 
the home firm, P2 is the price paid by home consumers for the foreign product.  Exogenous 
demand shifters such as consumer income and prices of competing foods are suppressed.  
The demand curve is downward sloping ( ), 0 1 > β an increase in the price of the foreign good 
increases the demand for the home good ( ), 0 1 > γ and demand is more sensitive to own price 
than to substitute price ( 1 1 γ β > ).  The tariff wedge is defined as: 
(2)    t P P + =
−
2 2  
where 
−
2 P is the f.o.b price received by the foreign seller (ignoring transportation and other 
transaction costs), and t is the per-unit dumping duty.   
Differentiating (1) and (2) with respect to the tariff yields:       10 
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measures tariff absorption, i.e., the extent to which the antidumping duty 







2 = 0), i.e., home consumers bear the tariff’s full incidence, (3) reduces to 
















and the demand effect is always positive provided: 













i.e., the vertical shift in the demand curve (the shift in the price direction with quantity held 







2 = -1), the price of the foreign good in the home market is unaffected by the 





  Under Bertrand duopoly tariff absorption is one half.  To see this, let Q21 be the 
quantity  sold  by  the  foreign  firm  in  the  home  market  and  Q22  be  the  quantity  sold  in 
alternative  export  markets  where  22 21 2 Q Q Q + = is  the  foreign  firm’s  total  exports.    For 
simplicity,  assume  the  foreign  firm  is  the  sole  supply  source  for  non-home  markets  (a       11 
situation  approximated  in  the  present  study  in  that  Europe,  Vietnam’s  major  alternative 
export market for frozen catfish fillets, does not produce the product).  The demand curves 
are:   
(6a)    1 2 2 2 2 21 P P Q γ β α + − =  
(6b)    3 3 3 22 P Q β α − =  
where P3 is the price charged by the foreign firm in non-home export markets.  As before, all 
parameters are positive, i.e., the demand curves are downward sloping ( ) 0 , 0 3 2 > > β β and 
the home good is a substitute for the foreign good ( ). 0 2 > γ  C2 and C3 are the foreign firm’s 
per-unit marginal cost of supplying the two markets, which is assumed be constant.  With 
these assumptions the foreign firm’s profit function is:  
 (7)    22 3 3 21 2 2 2 ) ( ) ( Q C P Q t C P − + − − = π . 
Bertrand competition implies the foreign firm takes the home firm’s price as given 







.  Maximizing (7) with respect to P2 
and P3 under this assumption and solving the resulting equations simultaneously yields the 
following reaction curve: 





























Under the stated assumptions, the price the foreign firm sets in the home country is 
positively related to the home country’s price, the price it charges in non-home markets, the 
cost of supplying the home country, and the tariff; it is negatively related to the cost of 
supplying non-home markets.  Importantly, the coefficient of t is one-half, which means an       12 
increase in the duty is split evenly between a rise in the home country’s price of the foreign 
good and a decrease in the net price received by the foreign firm.  This can be seen most 
clearly by substituting (2) into (8) to yield: 






































, which means the foreign firm absorbs half the duty, as claimed.  










 and an increase in the duty has a larger effect on the price of the foreign 
good in the home market than does an increase in the home price itself. 
  The  analysis  is  completed  by  bringing  into  play  the  home  firm’s  reaction  curve.  
Under the Byrd Amendment the home firm receives a portion of the duty receipts; hence, the 
profit function is as follows:  
(10)    21 1 1 1 1 ) ( Q t Q C P ϕ π + − =  
where C1 is the home firm’s constant marginal cost and φ is a parameter, less than one, that 
indicates the firm’s share of the total duties collected.  Maximizing (10) with respect to P1 
under the assumption the home firm takes P2 as given yields: 
















+ + + = . 
The interpretation of (11) is similar to (8) in that the home firm’s response to the 
foreign  competitor’s  price  depends  on  the  substitutability  of  the  foreign  good  for  the 
domestic good. If the goods are perfect substitutes such that 1 1 γ β = , a one dollar increase in       13 
the foreign good’s price causes the home firm to raise its price by 50 cents; if the goods are 
imperfect substitutes such that  1 1 β γ < , the home firm’s price will rise by less than 50 cents. 
  Importantly, the Byrd Amendment provides an incentive for the home firm to raise its 
price above that which would obtain in the absence of the Amendment.  This can be seen by 
noting that the tariff term in (11) disappears when φ = 0.  The intuition for this result, as 
explained by Evenett (2006, p. 734), is that, by raising its own price, the home firm can 
increase the demand for imports, which raises the value of duties collected.  The added 
incentive can be seen most clearly by substituting (2) into (11):      
















+ + + =
−  
where the coefficient of t measures the effect of an increase in the duty on the home firm’s 
price holding constant the foreign firm’s net price.  This effect is enlarged by an amount 
equal to the “Byrd term”  2 γ ϕ > 0.  From (12) the duty’s ability to raise home price depends 
crucially  on  product  differentiation  and  is  nil  when  the  foreign  and  home  goods  are 
independent ( 0 2 1 = =γ γ ). 
Comparison with Perfect Competition 
Given the importance of absorption for the efficacy of dumping duties, it is of some interest 
to compare the foregoing Bertrand results with the competitive solution.  For this purpose, 
we  assume  for  simplicity  that  the  home  market  has  just  two  sources  of  supply:  home 
production and imports from the foreign country in which the duty is imposed.  The supply 
equations for the home and imported goods are: 
(13)    1 1 1 1 1 1 ) ( C t P Q θ ψ ε φ − + + =        14 
(14)    2 2 2 2 2 21 ) ( C t P Q θ ε φ − − + =  
where the  i ε (> 0) parameters indicate the responsiveness of home production and imports to 
price,  and  the i θ (>  0)  parameters  indicate  the  effect  of  cost  factors  on  supply.      The  ψ 






ψ where  21 21
~
Q Q ≤ is the quantity of imports subject 
to  the  duty  and  1 1
~
Q Q ≤ is  the  quantity  of  domestic  production  certified  to  receive  duty 
revenue under the Byrd Amendment.  The composite term ψ t in essence measures the per-
unit subsidy enjoyed by domestic firms as a result of the Byrd Amendment. 
  Setting supply equal to demand [(13) = (1) and (14) = (6a)] and substituting (2) yields 
the following price-transmission equations: 



























































Comparing  these  equations  with  the  previously-derived  equations  for  Bertrand 
duopoly reproduced below  
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the most important difference is in the coefficients of t in (15) and (12).  Under Bertrand 
competition the Byrd Amendment enhances the positive effect of the duty on domestic price,       15 
under  perfect  competition  the  Byrd  Amendment  reduces  the  duty’s  positive  effect  on 
domestic price.  Specifically, the sign of the coefficient of t switches from positive in (12) to 
indeterminate in (15).  The intuition for this result is that firms in a competitive industry have 
no ability to influence price and thus respond to the Byrd subsidy simply by enlarging output, 
which has a depressing effect on home price.  Imperfectly competitive firms, on the other 
hand,  use  their  ability  to  set  price  by  strategically  raising  price,  which  lowers  quantity 
demanded for the home good, but raises imports, which enlarges profits associated with the 
Byrd  payments.    If  the  Byrd  Amendment  is  removed,  ψ  =  φ  =  0  and  both  models  are 
consistent in showing an unambiguous positive relationship between home price and the 
tariff under the stated parametric assumptions.    
  Finally, under Bertrand competition tariff absorption equals one half whereas under 
perfect competition absorption can range from zero to minus one.  For example, in a small-







)  and  the  duty  is 
ineffectual.  A full analysis of this case for a homogenous good is in Kinnucan (2003).  The 
upshot is that market structure plays a crucial role in how the Byrd Amendment affects 
market prices and trade flows, but also on the ability of anti-dumping duties to benefit home 
producers. 
Empirical Model for the Frozen Catfish Fillets 
Model Specification 
For empirical regression with the frozen catfish fillets case, some following assumptions are 
made: i) Vietnamese catfish dominates US catfish import when 90% of the catfish imported 
by US in 2000 came from Vietnam (Cohen and Hiebert, 2001).  Therefore, US catfish import       16 
from other foreign suppliers could be ignored in this study; ii) Catfish fillets produced by US 
and Vietnamese processors are differentiated under “labeling” law and biological species 
differences; and iii) U.S and Vietnamese firms behave as price setting duopolists. 
With the foregoing assumptions the econometric model used to test for duty effects is 
(17)  t p t k t k k t t t P a P a D a FINAL a PRELIM a a P , 7 , 2 6
5
3 , 2 1 0 , 1 ln ln ln ∆ + ∆ + + + + = ∆
−
= ∑  
  t t t t t t t sal e P a G a W a f a I a P a , 1 1 , 1 13 12 11 10 9 , 8 ln ln ln ln ln ln + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + −  
 (18)  t p t k t k k t t t P b P b D b FINAL b PRELIM b b P , 7 , 1 6
5
3 , 2 1 0 , 2 ln ln ln ∆ + ∆ + + + + = ∆ ∑ =
−
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5
3 , 2 1 0 , 1 ln ln ln  
  t t t t sal t p e Q c I c P c P c , 3 1 , 1 11 , 1 10 , 9 , 8 ln ln ln ln + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + −  
where  1 ln ln ln − − = ∆ t t t x x x denotes the first-difference operator.  Equations (17) and (18) 
correspond to the price reaction functions (12) and (9) whereas equation (19) corresponds to 
the domestic demand equation (1).  The time subscript t denotes months (t =1, 2, …, 84) for 
January 1999 through December 2005) and the  t i e , (i= 1, 2, 3) denote random disturbance 
terms.  Pp, Psal, Po and I are exogenous demand shifters.  Psal,t and Pp,t are the prices of 
imported  salmon  and  poultry  respectively  in  the  US  in  month  t.    Po,t  is  the  price  of 
Vietnamese catfish export to non-US markets.  It is US personal income per capita while Wt 
represents for US wage rate in manufacture sectors and Gt represents domestic energy price 
in month t. Variable ft is a monthly freight index for shipments from the Pacific used to proxy 
shipping costs from Vietnam to the US.  Xt is the real US-Vietnam exchange rate (VND/$) in       17 
month t.  A more complete description of the data and sources are provided in Table 2.  The 
price of Vietnamese catfish exported to non-US markets is deflated by the world Consumer 
Price Index (CPI); all other monetary variables in the model are deflated by US Consumer 
Price Index. 
The  tariff  effects  are  modeled  using  two  dummies:    PRELIM  for  the  period  of 
investigation  (June  2002  through  July  2003)  and  FINAL  for  the  implementation  period 
(August 2003 through December 2005).  The PRELIM variable is included to test whether 
foreign  firms  raise  price  during  the  investigation  period  in  order  to  reduce  the  dumping 
margin in the event of a positive ruling, as proposed by Blonigen and Heynes (2002) and by 
Feenstra (2004).  The tariff effect is the sum of the estimated coefficients from the two 
dummies.  Quarterly dummies are included to control for seasonal demand shifts (Kinnucan 
and Miao 1999).  The first difference logarithm specification is used because preliminary 
analysis  showed  the  variables  to  be  stationary,  coefficients  of  dummy  variables  can  be 
interpreted as relative change, and coefficients of continuous variables can be interpreted as 
elasticities.  Lagged dependent variables are specified to test for dynamic effects. 
To  determine  the  producer  impacts  of  the  tariff  we  augmented  the  foregoing 
wholesale-level model with the following inverse demand equation for catfish at the farm 
level: 
(20)    5 , 7 , 1 6
5
3 , 2 1 0 , ln ln ln − = ∆ + ∆ + + + + = ∆ ∑ t f t k t k k t t t f Q d P d D d FINAL d PRELIM d d P  
t t f t sal t p e P d P d P d , 4 1 , 10 , 9 , 8 ln ln ln + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + −        18 
where Pf,t is the price paid by US processors for live catfish purchased from farmers in month 
t, Qf,t is the quantity of live catfish purchased by US processors in month t,  t e , 4 is a random 
disturbance term, and the other variables are as previously defined. 
Regression results 
To  account  for  possible  cross-equation  correlation  in  the  error  terms  the  equations  were 
estimated  as  a  system  using  Seemingly  Unrelated  Regression  (SUR).    To  assess  the 
sensitivity of results to estimation procedure two sets of estimates are provided: a wholesale-
level model consisting of equations (17) – (19) and a combined wholesale-to-farm model 
consisting of equations (17) – (20).  Because estimation results are similar our discussion 
focuses on the wholesale model unless indicated otherwise.  
  Focusing first on the demand equation the model has an R
2 of 0.54 and most of the 
estimated coefficients have the correct signs.  The estimated coefficient of US price is -2.4 
with a t-ratio of -3.3, which suggests the domestic demand for US fillets is price elastic.  This 
implies that if home industry raises price to increase tariff revenues, as predicted by the 
Bertrand duopoly model, revenues from domestic sales will fall.  The estimated coefficient of 
US income is 1.4 with a t-ratio of 1.4.  Although the estimated income coefficient is larger 
than one, a one-tail test does not permit one to conclude that frozen fillets are a luxury good.  
Importantly, the estimated coefficient of Vietnam price is 0.13 with a t-ratio of 2.4.  This 
suggests a tariff-induced increase in the price of Vietnam fillets will have little effect on the 
demand for US fillets.  That US fillets are a poor substitute for Vietnam fillets should not be 
surprising in that the former are substantially more expensive (see table 1).  And this is true 
even allowing for full tariff pass through, i.e., assuming not of the tariff is absorbed by 
Vietnamese exporters. The estimated coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is -0.53       19 
with a t-ratio of -6.2.  The negative adjustment elasticity means that long-run elasticiites are 
smaller than short-run elasticities, which probably reflects inventory behavior.  (In the short-
run processors can meet a demand increase by drawing down inventory; in the long run 
production must be increased.) The remaining variables, including the two policy dummies 
PRELIM and FINAL, are insignificant at usual probability levels.   
Turning  to  the  price  reaction  functions  the  US  price  equation  shows  better 
explanatory power (R
2 = 0.48) than the Vietnam price equation (R
2 = 0.26), as might be 
expected due to the use of proxy variables in the latter.  Coefficient estimates are consistent 
with  theory  in  that  the  price  reaction  functions  are  upward  sloping  with  the  estimated 
coefficient of rival’s price in each equation positive.  However, the effects are asymmetric 
with  estimated  coefficient  of  US  price  elastic  at  5.0  (t-ratio  =  3.8)  and  the  estimated 
coefficient of Vietnam price inelastic at 0.02 (t-ratio = 2.6).   Thus, whereas the Vietnam 
price is highly sensitive to changes in the US price, the reverse is not true.  In particular, a 
10% increase in the Vietnam price would raise the US price by a mere 0.2% ceteris paribus.  
This result reinforces the inference from the demand equation that US fillets are a poor 
substitute for Vietnam fillets over the observed price range. 
The estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variable in the US and Vietnam 
price equations are 0.34 and -0.46, respectively, with t-ratios exceeding 3.8 in absolute value.  
Dividing the foregoing price effects by one minus these estimated coefficients yields long-
run  elasticities  of  3.4  and  0.03.    Hence,  the  conclusion  that  price  reaction  is  highly 
asymmetric is not much affected by length of run.           
Prices of salmon imports and poultry have no significant effect on both prices of the 
domestic and Vietnamese catfish fillets.  However, freight cost from Pacific gives significant       20 
and expected effects on the prices.  A 10% increase in freight cost from Pacific raises price of 
the domestic product by 1.1% but lowers price of the import from Vietnam by 12.3%. 
PRELIM is not significant in either equation.  Hence, the hypothesis that firms set 
price  strategically  during  the  investigation  period  to  influence  the  tariff  rate  is  rejected.  
FINAL  is  significant  in  the  US  price  equation  but  not  in  the  Vietnam  price  equation.  
Recalling that the Vietnam price is measured exclusive of the tariff, the lack of significance 
of  FINAL  in  the  Vietnam  price  equation  implies  US  consumers  bore  the  tariff’s  entire 
incidence.  Despite the tariff’s apparent ability to raise the US price of the imported product, 
it had little effect on the price of the US product.  In particular, the estimated coefficient of 
FINAL in the US price equation is 0.005, which means the US price during the duty period 
increased by a mere 0.5%, ceteris paribus.  The reason for this modest effect is the low 
cross-price elasticity of demand as explained in connection with the demand equation.  
In the extension model to explore the tariff effect on US farm price (Table 4), the 
regression results for US home price and Vietnamese price equations are similar to the ones 
in  Table  3,  except  coefficient  of  freight  cost  is  not  significant  any  more.    The  tariff 
coefficient in demand equation for US frozen catfish fillets becomes significant, although 
just at 90% level.  After the US antidumping is implemented, the demand for US catfish 
fillets rises by 3.1% associated to a 0.6% improvement in its price.  However, the positive 
effect of the antidumping on US farm price is not significant.  
Conclusion 
The  empirical  results  suggest  domestic  and  imported  catfish  compete  in  a  competitive 
condition rather than in a Bertrand strategy.  In a duopoly competition, the results can be 
explained by the nullification of the duty effect as time allows both firms adjust their prices.        21 
Further studies are necessary to examine long term effects of the antidumping measures. In 
the meantime, our analysis suggests antidumping duties are a weak tool for protecting the 
domestic  catfish  industry.    The  basic  reason  is  that  US  fillets  are  a  poor  substitute  for 
Vietnam fillets (cross-price elasticity = 0.13).  Hence, a tariff that raises the price of the 
imported  product  has  little  effect  on  the  demand  for  the  domestic  product.    Indeed,  our 
empirical estimates suggest the 45-64% duties imposed on imported frozen catfish fillets 
raised  the  domestic  price  of  frozen  catfish  fillets  by  less  than  one  percent,  and  had  no 
measurable effect on the farm price.  Still, industry efforts were not futile in that plaintiffs in 
the antidumping case were able to collect some $9.2 million in tariff revenue over the sample 
period (equivalent to 3% of wholesale value) thanks to the Byrd Amendment.        22 
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Table 1. Imports, Production and Prices of US Catfish Industry 1999-2005 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Frozen fillets imports from VN (mil. lb.)  1.99  7.04  17.12  9.62  4.25  6.57  17.42 
US frozen fillets production (mil.lb.)  102  120  115  131  125  122  124 
US Farm Production (mil. lb.)  597  594  597  631  661  630  601 
Vietnam export price ($/lb)  2.04  1.52  1.26  1.29  1.21  1.15  0.93 
US frozen fillets price ($/lb)  2.76  2.83  2.61  2.39  2.41  2.62  2.67 
Farm price (cent/lb.)  73  75  65  57  58  70  72 
 
Table 2. Description of variables and source of data 
Variable  Description  Unit  Source of data 
P1  Domestic price of frozen catfish fillets  $/lb  USDA 
P2
-  f.o.b price of Vietnamese frozen catfish fillets  $/lb  NMFS 
Psal  Price of salmon import  $/lb  NMFS 
Pp  US poultry price  $/lb  IMF 
I  US personal income per capita  $/year  US BEA 
F  Freight index from Pacific    US BLS 
W  US Wage of manufacture sector  $/hr  US BLS 
G  Energy index in US market    US BLS 
X  Real exchange rate  of VND against US$  VDN/$  www.oanda.com 
       27 
Table 3. SUR Estimates of Price Reaction and Demand Equations for Frozen Catfish 
Fillets 
  US Price  Vietnam Price  US Quantity 
Variable  Coef.  t-value  Coef.  t-value  Coef.  t-value 
PRELIM  0.000  0.068  0.015  0.426  0.001  0.054 
FINAL  0.005**  2.126  -0.022  -0.783  0.019  1.207 
US domestic price      4.972***  3.801  -2.359***  -3.268 
Vietnamese price  0.019***  2.613      0.131**  2.407 
Non-US market price      0.022  0.395     
Poultry price  0.019  0.253  -0.289  -0.293  -0.593  -1.068 
Salmon price  0.016  1.208  -0.026  -0.146  -0.122  -1.211 
US per capita income  0.128  1.228  -0.215  -0.149  1.421*  1.821 
Manufacture wage  0.207  1.329         
Energy index  0.004  0.151         
Freight index from Pacific  0.114**  2.106  -1.233*  -1.658     
Exchange rate       0.192  0.705     
Lag dependent variable  0.345***  3.879  -0.464***  -4.657  -0.533***  -6.246 
First quarter  0.008**  2.374  0.014  0.341  0.202***  8.392 
Second quarter  -0.003  -0.914  0.049  1.085  0.039*  1.694 
Third quarter  -0.005*  -1.748  0.050  1.242  0.090***  4.034 
Constant  -0.003  -1.213  -0.025  -0.741  -0.095***  -4.980 
R
2  0.48  0.26  0.54 
*, **, *** significant at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels  
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